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WHAT THE SUPREME COURT GIVETH, THE SUPREME 
COURT TAKETH AWAY-Gardner v. Gardner 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Gardner u. Gardnerl the North Carolina Supreme Court 
closed the door on all but a few of the plaintiffs it had only recently 
invited to file claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
The Gardner court held that it was unforeseeable, as a matter of 
law, that a parent who did not witness the accident which caused 
the death of her child would suffer severe emotional distress upon 
learning that her child ,had died.2 Thus, such a plaintiff cannot 
establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.3 
The court based its ruling on two factors: 1) plaintiff's "absence 
from the time and place of the tort" and 2) plaintiff's "failure to 
show that the defendant knew she was susceptible" to severe emo-
tional distress.4 By attaching so much importance to these fac-
tors, the court in Gardner severely limited the circumstances in 
which a plaintiff may establish a viable claim. The decision repre-
sents a major restriction of the court's 1990 landmark decision in 
Johnson u. Ruark Obstetrics and Gynecology Assocs., P.A.,5 and 
rejects the North Carolina Court of Appeals broad interpretation 
of Ruark's "foreseeability" test. However, by refusing to declare 
that these proximity and susceptibility factors are determinative 
while applying them a§ though they are, the court has created 
confusion and uncertainty in the law of tort. 
This Note reviews the Ruark decision and the cases decided 
in the wake of its expansive "foreseeability" test. It then analyzes 
1. 334 N.C. 662, 435 S.E.2d 324 (1993). 
2. Id. at 667, 435 S.E.2d at 328. 
3.Id. 
4.Id. 
5. 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990). In Ruark, the court held that the only 
requisite allegations for a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress are: 
"1) the defendant negligently engaged in conduct; 2) it was reasonably 
foreseeable that such conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress 
... ; and 3) the conduct did in fact cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress." 
Id. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. The court went on to state that the factors to 
consider in making a foreseeability determination are "the plaintiff's proximity 
to the negligent act", "the relationship between the plaintiff and the injured 
person", and "whether the plaintiff personally observed the negligent act." Id., at 
305, 395 S.E.2d at 98. The factors were not cited as elements of the claim. Id. 
481 
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the court's application of the factors established in Ruark to the 
facts of Gardner and questions the court's failure to establish 
more specific standards for determining foreseeability in negligent 
infliction of emotional distress cases. Next, this Note explores the 
possible effects of Gardner. This Note concludes that the Court 
should have set forth clearer standards to better guide the lower 
courts in deciding when a plaiutiff has stated a proper claim and 
suggests how the "foreseeability" test could be limited to strike' a 
balance between the extremes of compensating any person who 
suffers distress as a result of an injury to a family member and 
denying compensation to those who witness the injury or death of 
a close family member and as a result suffers severe emotional 
distress. 
II. THE CASE 
On August 18, 1990, thirteen-year-old Seth Campbell Gard-
ner was fatally injured when the truck in which he was a passen-
ger struck a bridge abutment.6 The vehicle was being driven by 
his father, Benjamin Gardner.7 At the time of the accident, Seth's' 
mother was at home several miles away.s After learning of the 
accident by telephone, she went directly to the emergency room.9 
She was present as her son was wheeled into the emergency room 
and observed rescue personnel attempting to resuscitate him. 10 
After her son was taken to..-.a treatment room, Mrs. Gardner 
waited in a private room. 11 She did not see her son again until 
after she was notified of his death. 12 
As administratrix of her son's estate, Mrs. Gardner filed a 
wrongful death action against Benjamin GardnerP In her indi-
vidual capacity, she asserted a claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. 14 She claimed that she suffered severe emo-
tional distress as a result of the defendant's negligence and that it 
6. Gardner , 334 N.C. 662, 663, 435 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1993). 
7.Id. 
8. Id. 
9.Id. 
10. Id. at 663, 435 S.E.2d at 326. 
11. Gardner, 334 N.C. 662, 664, 435 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1993). 
12.Id. 
13.' Id. Mrs. Gardner was authorized by statute to bring this action as 
administratrix of her son's estate. N.C. GEN. STAT. 28A-18-2 (1984). 
14. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 664,435 S.E.2d at 326. 
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1994] RESTRICTING RUARK 483 
was reasonably foreseeable that his conduct would cause her 
severe emotional distress. 15 
The defendant denied that plaintiff's severe emotional dis-
tress was reasonably foreseeable from his conduct and moved to 
dismiss the claim under Rule 12(b)( 6) of the North Carolina Rules 
of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted. 16 The parties stipulated for purposes of the 
motion that their son had died as a result of the defendant's negli-
gence and that the plaintiff had suffered severe emotional distress 
as .a result of the accident and death of her sonP Thus, the only 
issue before the court was whether it was reasonably foreseeable 
that the defendant's conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emo-
tional distress. The trial court ruled that, as a matter of law, the 
plaintiff could not establish a claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress because she had not witnessed the accident and 
was not in sufficiently close proximity to satisfy the "foreseeability 
factors" set forth in Ruark .18 It entered summary judgment for the 
defendant on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.19 
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's 
entry of partial summary judgment on the negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claim and held that the "defendant could have 
reasonably foreseen that his negligence might be a direct and 
proximate cause of the plaintiff's emotional distress."2o In doing 
so, the court rejected the defendant's contention that in Ruark the 
North Carolina Supreme Court had adopted a "close proximity" 
requirement for foreseeability in the context of this tort.21 The 
court emphasized that under Ruark close proximity was one of the 
15. [d. 
16. [d. at 664, 435 S.E.2d at 326. The trial court considered matters outside 
the pleadings and treated the motion as one for summary judgment under Rule 
56(c). [d. 
17. [d. 
18. [d. 
19. Gardner, 334 N.C. 662, 664, 435 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1993). Pursuant to Rule 
54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court certified the 
entry of partial summary judgment for immediate appeal. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 
662, 435 S.E.2d at 324. 
20. [d. at 664, 435 S.E.2d at 326. 
21. Gardner v. Gardner, 106 N.C. App. 635, 639, 418 S.E.2d 260, 263 (1992). 
In rejecting defendant's argument, the court of appeals pointed to Justice 
Meyer's dissent in Ruark, in which he stated that · he had been unable to 
persuade the majority to adopt a "close proximity" requirement. [d. Garner v. 
Gardner, 106 N.C. at 638-39, 418 S.E.2d at 262-63 (citing Ruark, 327 N.C. at 
309-14, 395 S.E.2d at 100-03 (Meyer, J., dissenting». 
3
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factors to be considered on the question of foreseeability, but it 
was not a requirement offoreseeability.22 Citing "common experi-
ence," the court stated that a parent who sees a dying child at the 
hospital after an accident may suffer as much distress as a parent 
who first sees the child at the scene of the accident.23 
The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, reversed the 
court of appeals and affirmed the entry of summary judgment .for 
the defendant on the plaintiff's claim.24 Although the court 
agreed that the close proximity factor suggested in Ruark was not 
a requirement, it held that "the plaintiff's injury was not reason" 
ably foreseeable and its occurrence was too remote from the negli-
gent act itself to hold the defendant liable for such 
consequences. "25 
III. BACKGROUND 
Prior to the Nprth Carolina Supreme Court's decision in 
.Johnson v. Ruark, negligent infliction of emotional distress claims 
in North Carolina were generally not permitted unless the emo-
tional distress either resulted from physical injury or was severe 
enough to cause physical injury.26 In Ruark, however, the North 
22. Gardner v. Gardner, 106 N.C. App. at 638, 418 S.E.2d at 262. Judge 
Eagles dissented and agreed with the defendant that because plaintiff did not 
observe the accident and was not in close proximity to the negligent act, she 
"failed to establish the sufficient - proximity to satisfy the foreseeability 
requirements of Ruark." [d. at 640, 418 S.E.2d at 263 (Eagles, J ., dissenting). 
23. [d. at 639, 418 S.E.2d at 263. 
24. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 668, 435 S.E.2d at 328. 
25. [d. In ruling that the "common experience" relied on by the court of 
appeals was not enough, the court stated that "part of living involves some 
unhappy and disagreeable emotions with which we must cope without recovery 
of damages." [d. at 667, 435 S.E.2d at 328. (quoting Gates v. Richardson, 719 
P.2d 193, 198 (Wyo. 1986)). 
26. See, e.g. , Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 198-99, 254 S.E.2d 611,623 
(1979) (stating that it is "clear that plaintiff must show some physical injury 
resulting from the emotional disturbance caused by defendant's alleged 
conduct"); King v. Higgins, 272 N.C. 267, 158 S.E.2d 67, 69 (1967) (disallowing 
recovery absent any "disfiguring injury"); Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 
503, 112 S.E.2d 48, 52 (1960) (recovery for emotional distress allowed when 
accompanied by simultaneous physical impact or injury). There were some 
special exceptions to this general rule for cases involving negligent 
transportation or mishandling of a corpse. See Stephenson v. Duke Univ., 202 
N.C. 624,163 S.E. 698 (1932). For a comprehensive survey ofthe tort of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress in North Carolina, see Robert G. Byrd, Recovery 
for Mental Anguish in North Carolina, 58 N.C. L. REV. 435 (1980). 
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Carolina Supreme Court abolished the physical injury 
requirement.27 
In Ruark, the plaintiffs were the parents of a child who was 
still born as a result of the defendant doctor's negligence.28 After 
an extensive review of North Carolina's treatment of negligent 
infliction of emotional distress, the court held that "neither a 
physical impact, a physical injury, nor a subsequent physical man-
ifestation of emotional distress is an element of the tort of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress."29 The court held that to 
state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, "a plain-
tiff must allege that 1) the defendant negligently engaged in con-
duct, 2) · it was reasonably foreseeable that such conduct would 
cause plaintiff severe emotional distress, ... and 3) the conduct 
did in fact cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress."30 The 
court defined severe emotional distress to include a wide range of 
disorders that are generally recognized and diagnosed by trained 
professionals.31 
The court identified three factors to be considered when deter-
mining the issue of foreseeability: 1) the plaintiff's proximity to 
the negligent act; 2) the relationship between the plaintiff and the 
27. Ruark, 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 85 (1990) . 
28. [d. at 286, 395 S.E.2d at 86. 
29. Id. at 304,395 S.E.2d at 97. This holding is arguably in accord with prior 
North Carolina case law, insofar as the earliest cases are concerned. See, e.g., 
Bailey v. Long, 172 N.C. 661, 90 S.E.2d 809 (1916) (husband could recover 
damages for mental anguish suffered when his wife died as a result of the 
doctor's negligence). Subsequent courts, however, quickly curtailed Bailey. See 
Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 125, 126 S.E. 307, 310 (1925), 
overruled on other grounds by Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hospital, 
Inc., 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980). As a result, the court's decision in 
Ruark effectively overruled decades of case law. See supra note 26 and cases 
cited therein. 
30. Ruark, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. The usefulness of 
"foreseeability" as a restrictive aspect of a claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress is discussed thoroughly by the court and questioned 
vigorously by Justice Meyer in his lengthy dissent. Id. at 304-06, 395 S.E.2d at 
97-98, 100-03. For a discussion of foreseeability standards applied in other 
jurisdictions, see Tracy L. Hamrick, On A Clear Judicial Day in North 
Carolina-Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics Smooths the Way for Plaintiffs' Claims 
for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1714 (1991). 
31. Ruark, 327 N.C. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 97. Specifically, the .court defined 
severe emotional distress as "any emotional or mental disorder, such as, for 
example, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of 
severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally 
recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so." Id. 
5
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injured person; and 3) whether the phlintiff personally observed 
the negligent act.32 The application of the foreseeability concept, 
the court explained, "must be determined under all the facts 
presented and should be resolved on a case-by-case basis by the 
trial court and, when appropriate, by a jury."33 Applying these 
factors to the facts in Ruark , the court concluded that the plain-
tiffs' allegations of emotional distress were sufficient to support 
their cause of action.34 
The Ruark decision was accompanied by a strongly worded 
dissent by Justice Meyer which focused on the difficulties 
presented by the "foreseeability" concept.35 Condemning the rule 
adopted by the majority as "overbroad,"36 Justice Meyer criticized 
the majority for providing "no real limitation on foreseeability."37 
He predicted that the decision would invite a flood of litigation 
which would have detrimental effects on the availability and price 
of insurance and impose severe societal costS.38 
The Ruark decision sent shockwaves throughout the North 
Carolina legal community. The "foreseeability" test adopted by 
the court arguably converted North Carolina into one of the most 
liberal jurisdictions in the country on the issue of recovery for neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress.39 The reaction to Ruark 
32. Id. at 305, 395 S.E.2d at 98. 
33. Id. at 304, 395 S.E.2d at 98. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 309-14, 395 S.E.2d at 100~03 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Justice Meyer 
also expressed strong reservations concerning the court's treatment of the 
concepts of duty and proximate cause. Id. at 309-11, 395 S.E.2d at 100-01 
(Meyer, J., dissenting). Justice Webb also filed a dissent on the grounds that the 
majority's holding represented a marked departure from previous decisions and 
that reversal of the prior decisions was not justified. Id. at 318, 395 S.E.2d at 
106 (Webb, J ., dissenting). 
36. Id. at 313, 395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting). 
37. Id. at 309, 395 S.E.2d at ioo (Meyer, J., dissenting). Justice Meyer 
criticized the court for failing to establish "any limitations whatsoever on the 
duty not to negligently inflict foreseeably serious emotional distress" and 
"provid[ing] no guidance to the judges and juries that must implement it." Id. at 
312-13, 395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting). 
38. Id. at 312, 395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting). 
39. California at one time was thought to have the most liberal approach. See 
Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, (Cal. 1968) (en banc) (requiring consideration of: 1) 
whether plaintiff was in close proximity to the scene; 2) whether the plaintiff's 
emotional distress resulted from the "sensory and contemporaneous observance 
of the accident"; and 3) whether the plaintiff was "closely related" to the victim). 
The Ruark factors are similar to those enumerated in Dillon. When Ruark was 
decided, however, Dillon had been narrowed signific'antly by the California 
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was dominated by concerns that the case opened the door to 
unlimited liability for defendants.4o Members of the defense bar 
feared that the "foreseeability" test would make it too easy for 
plaintiffs to win large civil verdicts.41 In addition, there was con-
cern over the court's failure to provide practical standards or ade-
quate guidance to the lower courtS.42 The broad "foreseeability" 
test adopted in Ruark had been rejected by a number of states in 
favor of more definite guidelines.43 Most notably, the California 
Supreme Court had recently rejected a standard substantially 
similar to that established in Ruark, characterizing the "foresee-
ability" test as "unworkable" and "conf1,lsing."44 Following Ruark, 
the North Carolina courts were expected to encounter the same 
difficulties applying and interpreting the "foreseeability" test with 
the results being uncertainty in the courts and inequity for the 
parties.45 
Supreme Court's decision in Thingv. LaChusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989). Justice 
Meyer criticized the majority for "go[ing] beyond even Dillon's broad approach." 
Ruark, 327 N.C. at 308, 395 S.E.2d at 99 (Meyer, J ., dissenting). For further 
discussion of the problems with the Dillon standards, see generally John L. 
Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Towards a Unified Theory of Compensating 
Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 477 (1984) 
(critical of Dillon for using foreseeability as a restriction); Note, Bystander 
Recovery: A Policy Oriented Approach, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 877,888-98 (1987) 
(discussing the difficulties of applying Dillon). 
40. See Hamrick, supra note 30, at 1729-30. 
41. Id. Justice Webb noted" that while the physical injury requirement is 
"somewhat arbitrary" it does serve to limit the potential liability of defendants. 
Ruark, 327 N.C. at 318, 395 S.E.2d at 106 (Webb, J., dissenting). As one 
commentator noted, "with respect to mental "anguish claims . . . the fear of 
indefinite liability is a legitimate one, and the need to impose reasonable limits 
upon the extent of a defendant's responsibility clearly exists." Byrd, supra note 
26, at 448. 
42. Ruark, 327 N.C. at 312-13,395 S.E.2d at 102 (Meyer, J., dissenting). 
43. Id. at 308-16, 395 S.E.2d at 99-104 (Meyer, J., dissenting). 
44. See Thing, 771 P.2d at 918. Thing replaced the standards set forth in 
Dillon, with the following requirements: 1) the plaintiff must be closely related to 
t?e v~ctim; 2) plaintiff must have been present at the scene of the injury at the 
time It occurred and had to be aware that the injury was occurring; and 3) the 
plaintiff must have suffered serious emotional distress beyond that which would 
be anticipated in a disinterested bystander. Thing, 771 P.2d at 829-30. See 
supra note 39. 
45. The Ruark court appeared unconcerned by this, however stating that 
:'our trial courts have adequate means available to them for' disposing of 
Improper claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and for adjusting 
excessive or inadequate verdicts." Ruark, 327 N.C. at 306, 395 S.E.2d at 98. 
Contra Thing, 771 P.2d at 833 (Kaufman, J., concurring) (recognizing that 
7
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Justice Meyer's concerns were proven valid as the trial courts' 
attempts to apply the "foreseeability" test set forth in Ruark to 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claims were repeatedly 
reversed by the court of appeals.46 Whereas the trial courts nar-
rowly applied the "foreseeability" test, the court of appeals applied 
it in such a way that allowed an almost unlimited number of 
plaintiffs to state a claim for emotional distress. The court of 
appeals held in five decisions that a plaintiff with a close familial 
relationship with a person who is injured or killed by the negli-
gence of another may state a cause of action for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress without having been in close proximity to or 
having observed the negligent act of the defendant.47 Thus, under 
the court of appeals' interpretation of Ruark and its "foreseeabil-
ity" test, any person with a close familial relationship (i.e, parent! 
child or husband/wife) to a person killed or injured by a defend-
ant's negligence is a "foreseeable plaintiff" with a cause of action 
"Dillon's confident prediction that future courts would be able to fix just and 
sensible boundaries on bystander liability has been found to be wholly ill~sory­
both in theory and practice"). 
46. See, e.g., Butz v. Holder, 112 N.C. App. 116, 434 S.E.2d 862; (1993); 
Hickman v. McKoin, 109 N.C. App. 478, 428 S.E.2d 251 (1993); Anderson v. 
Baccus, 109 N.C. App. 16, 426 S.E.2d 105 (1993); Sorrells v. M.Y.B. Hospitality 
Ventures, 108 N.C. App. 668, 424 S.E.2d 676 (1993); Gardner v. Gardner, 106 
N.C. App. 635, 418 S.E.2d 260 (19g-2). In each of the post-Ruark decisions, the 
court of appeals reversed the trial court. This underscores the disagreement 
among the trial and appellate judges as they attempted to define the limits of 
Ruark. These cases also demonstrated that without clearer guidelines, trial 
courts would find it nearly impossible ' to dispose of negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claims through summary judgment. 
47. See, e.g., Butz, 112 N.C. App. at 117, 434 S.E.2d at 863 (parents could 
state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress following death of child 
who was struck by a car while riding his bicycle); Hickman, 109 N.C. App. at 479, 
428 S.E.2d at 252 (children who were not at the scene of the accident could state 
a claim for emotional distress following the injury of their mother in an 
automobile accident); Anderson, 109·N.C. App. at 25,426 S.E.2d at 110 (husband 
who was not present at scene of accident could state a claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress following death of wife and unborn child in 
automobile accident); Sorrells, 108 N.C. App. at 672, 424 S.E.2d at 679 (parents 
who were not present at scene of accident could state claim against bar that 
served son alcohol for negligent infliction of emotional distress following death of 
son in drunk driving accident); Gardner, 106 N.C. App. at 639,418 S.E.2d at 263 
(mother who was not present at scene of accident could state a claim against 
father of her sori who was driving at the time of the accident for emotional 
distress resulting from the death of her son). 
8
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against the defendant for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress.48 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In Gardner, the North Carolina Supreme Court had its first 
opportunity to reexamine its decision in Ruark and to provide 
some much needed guidance to the lower courts on the proper 
application of the "foreseeability" test enunciated in Ruark. On 
October 8, 1993, the court issued its decision in Gardner which 
reaffirmed its decision in Ruark. Applying Ruark to the facts in 
Gardner, the court held that "plaintiff's injury was not reasonably 
foreseeable and its occurrence was too remote for the negligent act 
itself to hold the defendant liable for such consequences."49 Gard-
ner makes it clear that a close familial relationship between the 
plaintiff and the injured person for whom the plaintiff is con-
cerned, is insufficient standing alone to establish the element of 
foreseeability. Gardner thus significantly restricts the scope of 
Ruark. 
Once again shockwaves were felt throughout the legal com-
munity. This time, however, the bulk of the criticisms came from 
plaintiffs' attorneys who felt that the court had so narrowed the 
scope of Ruark as to make it difficult to ever succeed on a claim for 
emotional distress. 
In Gardner, the court based its holding on two factors: prox-
imity and susceptibility. The court noted that the mother was sev-
eral miles away when the accident occurred and stated that while 
her absence from the scene of the accident is not determinative, it 
unquestionably "militates" against the foreseeability of her result-
ing emotional distress.5o The court reasoned that because she was 
not in close proximity to, nor did she observe, the defendant's neg-
ligent act, she was not able "to see, hear or otherwise sense" the 
48. Gardner, 106 N.C. App. at 639, 418, S.E.2d at 263. 
49. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 668, 435 S.E.2d at 328. In the other part of a one-
two punch delivered to plaintiffs by the court that day, the court ruled in Sorrells 
v. M.Y.B. Hospitality Ventures, 334 N.C. 669, 674, 435 S.E.2d 320, 323 (1993), 
that two parents who suffered emotional distress when their son was killed after 
the defendant bar had served him too much alcohol had no claim. The court held 
that the possibility that the defendant's negligence would lead to the son's death 
and the parents' anguish was too remote to be foreseeable. The reasoning in 
Sorrells is consistent with that in Gardner. The impact of Sorrells, however, will 
be more limited than that of Gardner because the facts in Gardner more closely 
match the factors set forth in Ruark. 
50. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 667, 435 S.E.2d at 327. 
9
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accident or to perceive the injuries to her son. 51 Furthermore, the 
court stated that "more important" than the mother's absence 
from the scene of the accident was that "there was neither [an] 
allegation nor [a] forecast of evidence that the defendant knew the 
plaintiff was, subject to an .emotional pr mental disorder or other 
severe disabling emotional or mental condition as a result of his 
negligence and its consequences."52 Absent such knowledge, the 
court said, such ali outcome cannot be held to be reasonably fore-
seeable and plaintiff failed to establish a claim. 53 
A. Proximity 
While categorically rejecting any notion that any of the three 
factors set forth in Ruark are determinative of foreseeability, the 
Gardner court placed great emphasis on the fact that the plaintiff, 
Mrs. Gardner, was not in close proximity to, nor did she observe, 
the defendant's negligent act.54 Although the court still ada-
mantly insists that proximity is just one factor to be considered in 
determining foreseeability, Gardner and subsequent cases make 
it clear that nothing short of being present at the time the acci-
dent occurs or at least close enough to perceive the accident will 
support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. For 
example, in Sorrells v. M. Y.B. Hospitality Ventures, 55 the court 
refused to ground the decision solely on the plaintiffs' absence 
from the scene of the negligent act but did cite that absence as 
particularly relevant. 56 Most recently, the court held in Anderson 
v. Baccus ,57 . that even though the plaintiff husband arrived at the 
scene shortly after the accident and personally observed his wife 
before she was removed from the wreckage, he was not in close 
51. [d. 
52. [d. at 667,435 S.E.2d at 328 (emphasis added). 
53. [d. 
54. Gardner, 334 N.C. 662, 667-68, 435 S.E.2d 324,327-28 (1993). The court 
stated that the plaintiff's absence from the scene "unquestionably militat[ed] 
against the foreseeability of her emotional distress." [d. at 667, 435 S.E.2d at 
327. 
55. 334 N.C. 669, 435 S.E.2d 320 (1993). In Sorrels, the plaintiffs sought to 
recover damages from the bar that had served their son alcohol prior to his death 
in a drunk driving accident. [d. 
56. [d. at 674, 435 S.E.2d at 323. 
57. 335 N.C. 526, 439 S.E.2d 136 (1994). 
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proximity to and did not observe the defendant's negligent act 
and, thus, could not recover for emotional distress.58 
Attorneys, thus, are faced with a court that insists that prox-
imity is only a factor in, but treats it as determinative of, foresee-
ability. As a result, an attorney who fails t6 bring a negligent 
infliction of emotional distress claim because the plaintiff was not 
on the scene of the accident may be committing malpractice. At 
the same time, however, in view of Gardner, Sorrells, and Ander-
son, such a claim likely will be dismissed resulting only in wasted 
time, money, and judicial resources. Rather than requiring liti-
gants and trial courts to guess whether the proximity factor is 
strong enough in a given case to support a claim, the court should 
place some clear limits on proximity. 59 For instance, the court 
could simply require that the plaintiff be on the scene when the 
party for whom the plaintiff is concerned is injured. This require-
ment would give litigants and lower courts a clear standard by 
which to make their decisions regarding negligent infliction of 
emotional distress claims. At the same time, it would not limit 
claims any more than they are presently limited under Gardner, 
Sorrells, and Anderson . . 
B. Susceptibility 
Susceptibility was not mentioned in Ruark, but it played a 
key part in the Gardner decision.60 The court's basic premise is 
that it is not normal for a parent to experience severe emotional 
distress, as defined in Ruark ,61 over the death of a child.62 There-
58. On rehearing in Butz v. Holder, 113 N.C. App. 156, 437 S.E.2d 672 (1993), 
the court of appeals read Gardner broadly to strike the emotional distress claim 
even though the proximity factor was very strong. 
59. See, e.g., Thing, 771 P.2d at 830 (recovery denied to mother who was 
neither present at the scene nor aware that son was being injured); Kelley v. 
Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 532 P.2d 673, 676 (Haw. 1975) (physical proximity 
to scene is determining factor); Wilder v. City of Keene, 557 A.2d 636,639 (N.H. 
1989) (no recovery for parents who did not see nor hear the collision); Barris v. 
Grange Mut. Cos., 545 N.E.2d 83, 91 (Ohio 1989) (no recovery for parent who had 
no sensory perception of events surrounding accident); Gain· v. Carroll Mill Co., 
787 P.2d 553, 557 (Wash. 1990) (to recover plaintiff must be at the scene of the 
accident or arrive shortly after the accident). 
60. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 667, 435 S.E.2d at 328. 
61. See supra note 31. 
62. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 667, 435 S.E.2d at 328. The court noted the 
distinction drawn in Ruark between "temporary fright, disappointment and 
regret," which by itself is not compensable, and "severe emotional distress" for 
which a plaintiff may recover. [d. The court then concluded that while anyone 
11
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fore, the court concluded that a claim for emotional distress ' 
requires reasonable foresight that the plaintiff will not only 
become distraught, but also will suffer severe emotional distress.63 
This requirement is unusual in that it is contrary to the notion 
that a defendant takes his victim as he finds him. Instead, it 
allows only the uncommonly sensitive family members to recover 
and then only if their unnatural susceptibility is known in 
advance to the defendant. 
Applying this standard in Gardner, the court held that 
despite the fact that the plaintiff and defendant were married and 
the defendant thus presumably knew the plaintiff very well, plain-
tiff failed to show that the defendant knew she was susceptible to 
an emotional or mental disorder or other severe and disabling 
mental condition as a result of his negligence and its 
consequences.64 
Although the Gardner court characterized the three elements 
of negligent infliction of emotional distress set forth in Ruark, 65 as 
the "only requisite allegations," it appears that is not really what 
the court meant.66 Under Gardner, to establish the element of 
foreseeability, the plaintiff must also allege and offer evidence suf-
ficient to show that the defendant knew that the plaintiff was sus-
ceptible to severe emotional distress as a result of his negligent 
act.67 In both Sorrells and Anderson the court based its decision 
to dismiss the plaintiffs' negligent infliction of emotional distress 
claims in part on the fact that they did not show that the defend-
ant knew they were susceptible to severe emotional distress.68 
After Gardner, Sorrells, and Anderson, it is clear that a plain-
tiff who merely alleges that the severe emotional distress they suf-
fered was a reasonably foreseeable con'sequence of the defendant's 
negligent conduct will almost certainly have their claim dis-
should foresee that virtually any parent will suffer some emotional distress . .. to 
establish a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress the law requires 
reasonable foresight of an emotional or mental disorder or other severe disabling 
emotional or mental condition." Id. (emphasis added). 
63.Id. 
64.Id. 
65 . See supra note 5. 
66. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 665,435 S.E.2d at 327. 
67. In Butz, 113 N.C. App. 156, 437 S.E.2d 672 (1993), the court of appeals 
interpreted Gardner to require plaintiffs to allege and prove knowledge of their 
susceptibility to severe emotional distress. Id. 
68. See Sorrells, 334 N.C. at 674, 435 S.E.2d at 323; Anderson, 335 N.C. at 
532, 439 S.E.2d at 140. 
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missed.69 It is not clear, however, what exactly the plaintiff must 
allege. For instance, it is unclear whether previous knowledge of 
susceptibility is required in all claims for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress or only when the plaintiff is absent from the 
scene of the negligent act.70 Furthermore, it will be ,the rare case 
in which a defendant has actual knowledge of an individual's par-
ticular susceptibilities in advance of the negligent conduct. While 
it may be desirable to limit liability for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress, in Gardner the court appears to have drawn a line 
that essentially eliminates the claim altogether. If negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress is to have any meaningful application, 
such knowledge cannot always be required.71 
The long-range effect of the susceptibility factor will depend 
in part on whether it is a strict test of foreseeability, or only one of 
several factors. Gardner appears to say that prior knowledge of 
susceptibility is a requirement.72 In Sorrells, however, the court 
was careful to point out that there are no requirements, only a 
number of factors to be considered.73 Regardless of the ultimate 
resolution, the court's use of the "foreseeability" test is confusing. 
If the court's purpose is to limit the application of negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress, then it can do so without trying to fit 
prior knowledge of susceptibility under the "foreseeability" test. 
Restrictions could be based on the relationship between the plain-
tiff and the injured or deceased person 74 and the proximity of the 
69. See, e.g., Butz, 113 N.C. App. 156,437 S.E.2d 672 (1993). 
. 70. The susceptibility factor has been applied. only in cases where the plaintiff 
did not personally observe the defendant's negligent act. 
71. It is questionable whether the plaintiffs in Ruark could recover under 
Gardner. The plaintiff-father probably would not be able to establish a claim 
because he did not allege and probably could not show that the defendant doctor 
had any knowledge of his emotional susceptibility. Ruark, 327 N.C. at 336, 395 
S.E.2d at 98. Furthermore, because the father did not witness the doctor's 
negligent acts and omissions, he could not meet the proximity requirement. Id. 
Although the father alleged that he observed many of the events surrounding the 
stillbirth of his child, the doctor's negligence occurred prior to the birth during 
the prenatal care. Id. Even though the mother did not allege that the doctor 
knew she was susceptible to distress, that requirement would not be as critical in 
her case. Id. She was not a third-party bystander to the doctor's negligence, but 
a victim of it. Id. Therefore she probably could have proceeded with her claim. 
72. Gardner, 334 N.C. at 667,435 S.E.2d at 328. 
73. Sorrells, 334 N.C. at 674, 435 S.E.2d at 323. 
74. See, e.g., Thing, 771 P.2d at 829-30, (mother of victim is "closely related"); 
Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 587 (Cal. 1988) (unmarried cohabitant is not 
entitled to recover). 
13
McNeer: What the Supreme Court Giveth, the Supreme Court Taketh Away - Ga
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994
494 CAMPBELL LAw REVIEW [Vol. 16:481 
plaintiff to the negligent conduct.75 These requirements would 
sufficiently limit liability, but allow recovery for legitimate claims 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Gardner the North Carolina Supreme Court held that, as a 
matter of law, a mother who suffered severe emotional distress as 
a result of the death of her son in an automobile accident, but who 
was not present at the scene of the accident, cannot recover dam-
ages for emotional distress from the defendant driver, her hus-
band, because such damages are unforeseeable. In so ruling, the 
court severely limited the scope of Ruark and the circumstances 
under which a plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress. The Gardner court, however, insisted that the 
validity of negligent infliction of emotional distress claims be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis and refused to set any clear stan-
dards for determining whether the severe emotional distress com-
plained of was foreseeable. The experience in other jurisdictions 
warns that vague "foreseeability factors" can cause confusion and 
uncertainty. The ad hoc approach the court has chosen to take 
will foster uncertainty and confusion among North Carolina 
courts and result in inconsistent treatment of cases. The trial 
courts and litigants need better guidance from the court as to 
when severe emotional distress is foreseeable. The court should 
clearly state that to recover for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, a plaintiff must personally observe the negligent act of 
the defendant, be a close family member of the victim, and suffer 
severe emotional distress beyond that which one would expect to 
result from any similar tragedy. A plaintiff should not be required 
to show that the defendant knew ofthe plaintiff's susceptibility to 
suffer severe emotional distress . . In the wake of Gardner, unless 
these or similarly clear standards are· adopted, the tort of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress will provide, if any, little rem-
edy for plaintiffs. 
Alice McNeer 
75. See supra note 59. 
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